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Spanning the Institutional Abyss: The Intergovernmental Network 
and the Governance of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
Global economic transactions such as foreign direct investment must extend over an 
institutional abyss between the jurisdiction, and therefore protection, of the states 
involved.  Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), whose members are states, represent 
an important attempt to span this abyss.  IGOs are mandated variously to smooth 
economic transactions, facilitate global cooperation, and promote cultural contact and 
awareness.   We use a network approach to demonstrate that the connections between two 
countries through joint-membership in the same IGOs are associated with a large positive 
influence on the foreign direct investment that flows between them.  Moreover, we show 
that this effect occurs not only in the case of IGOs that focus on economic issues, but 
also on those with social and cultural mandates.  This demonstrates that relational 
governance is important and feasible in the global context, and for the most risky 
transactions.  Finally we examine the interdependence between the IGO network and the 
domestic institutions of states.  The interdependence between these global and domestic 
institutional forms is complex, with target-country democracy being a substitute for 
economic IGOs, but a complement for social and cultural IGOs. 
   3
Recent decades have seen a substantial increase in economic transactions that span 
national borders, a phenomenon known widely as economic globalization.  As with 
international interactions of all types, economic globalization presents intriguing 
questions regarding governance.  Theories of the governance of economic transactions 
have been developed mostly in the domestic context.  The state is always conspicuous in 
these theories, as the ultimate institutional authority within a country, and therefore the 
backbone of the relevant institutional framework, even when private institutions are 
prominent in that framework.  In stark contrast, there is no equivalent of the state to serve 
as the ultimate authority over international transactions.  In terms of extant accounts of 
governance which depend on the state even if they don’t focus on it, such transactions 
must cross an institutional abyss. 
The bridges across this abyss are organizations, specifically multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).  MNCs may subsume 
international economic transactions within their bureaucracies when they operate 
interdependent units in different countries.  This phenomenon, called foreign direct 
investment (FDI), is the fastest growing economic indicator of globalization.  Between 
1980 and 2003 the stock of FDI as a percentage of world GDP increased by 240%, much 
faster than the trade to GDP ratio, which increased 22% over that period (Guillen, 2006).  
The role of IGOs, which are organizations of states, is to provide international 
institutional rules that may facilitate international surety, coordination and trust (Fligstein 
and Stone-Sweet, 2002).  In this paper we consider the interdependence between these 
two forms of organizational governance by investigating how FDI extending from a 
company based in one country to another country is affected by the connections between   4
the two countries forged by simultaneous joint membership in IGOs. In other words, the 
phenomenon of MNCs investing in operations that span borders is our dependent 
variable, and the network of IGO connections between countries is our main explanatory 
variable. 
Our approach is motivated by the recognition that FDI is at the same time a 
solution to some of the challenges of governing international economic exchange, and a 
source of unique governance problems.  FDI enables some global transactions by 
enfolding them in the organizational structures of MNCs, where bureaucratic rules and 
policies may govern them.  This role is particularly important to facilitate the transfer of 
intangible assets, such as the knowledge or reputation of an MNC across borders (Teece, 
1985; Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001).  On the other hand, FDI creates and 
exacerbates other governance problems because, relative to the alternative of trade, it 
represents greater investments of capital and intangible assets by the company, and 
therefore increases the risk.  FDI also typically is accompanied by some (perhaps 
temporary) transfer of workers between countries, which creates a type of transaction 
cost which is typically absent in trade. 
It is because FDI presents notable governance challenges that we ask what other 
sources of institutional support may facilitate FDI.  Here, we build on recent work that 
has identified the network of bilateral connections forged by IGOs as an important 
influence on the management of international relations of many types.  Many IGOs exist 
explicitly to promote collective global goals, such as peace and efficient trade.  However, 
it is only recently that evidence has begun to accumulate in support of the idea that they 
contribute to these ends.  The foundation for this new evidence is the recognition that   5
IGOs operate by forging a network of connections between countries, and infusing that 
network with institutional content
1.  We show that when two countries become more 
strongly connected through the IGO network, FDI flows between them increase.   
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that it is not only connections through IGOs formed 
for economic purposes that matter, but that connections through social and culture IGOs 
also promote FDI.  Social and cultural IGOs operate to promote familiarity, goodwill and 
trust between nations, so our finding that they also promote FDI shows that social 
mechanisms are also important for the governance of international economic transactions. 
We further investigate the operation of IGOs to promote FDI by asking whether 
IGO governance is more effective for some countries than others.  The uneven flow of 
FDI has been cited as a major inhibition to economic development.  Indeed, in his 
criticism of the failure of IGOs such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO to promote 
development in poor countries, Stiglitz (2003:6) specifically cites the inability of African 
countries to attract foreign investment as fundamental to the problem (see also Easterly, 
2006).  To explain country-variation, we analyze whether the efficacy of IGO 
connections depends on the level of democracy in the target country.  Democracy and the 
democratic division of powers may allow target-country governments to credibly commit 
to MNCs to protect their investments, and therefore may be a substitute for the 
governance that IGO connections provide.  Our results indicate that this substitution 
between domestic and global institutions does in fact occur in the case of economic IGO 
connections.  Surprising to us, social/cultural IGO connections and target-country 
                                                 
1 The “network turn” of IGO analysis has recently yielded important evidence that IGOs influence 
important bilateral outcomes such as the incidence of war (e.g., Russett and Oneal, 2001;  Gartzke, 2002; 
Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006) and trade (Ingram, Robinson and Busch, 2005) and encourage the 
production of global collective goods such as environmental sustainability (Ward, 2006).   6
democracy have the opposite interdependence: They complement rather than substitute 
for each other. 
 
The Challenge of International Economic Exchange 
How different is international economic exchange from its domestic equivalent?  
A telling result is Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) finding that national borders 
reduce trade between the US and Canada by about 40% and among other industrialized 
countries by about 30%. By comparing the magnitude of border effects to those of 
distance in gravity-models of trade, Helliwell (2002) concludes that the effect of a border 
to discourage trade is equivalent to adding 10,000 miles of distance between the traders.  
This equivalency is all the more impressive in light of the fact that effect of physical 
distance to discourage trade is substantial, more than would be expected merely from 
transportation costs. 
The effect of borders to discourage trade derives from two sources.  The first is 
that (ideally) states provide institutions to facilitate economic exchange domestically, and 
these institutions do not operate across borders because of the limitations on any one 
state’s jurisdiction.  The relevant institutions may be roughly divided into those that 
provide surety and those that facilitate coordination.  In the realm of surety, strong laws 
that enforce contracts, protect property rights, and otherwise reduce transaction costs at 
the domestic level enable exchange partners to credibly commit to future actions, and 
reduce the risk of malfeasance (North, 1990).  And while private actors also provide 
surety for economic transactions, in doing so they typically depend on the background of 
formal institutions of the state, as when private bargaining over contract disputes takes   7
place “in the shadow of the law” (Macauley, 1963) or when organizations that make 
assurances, such as auditors, stock exchanges, and banks, rely on state regulation to 
facilitate their own credible commitments.  As for state institutions that facilitate 
coordination, the most obviously relevant is the provision of a common currency, a 
critical ingredient for smoothing exchange (Rose, 2001).  Likewise, almost all states 
support communications and travel within their borders, and provide exchange-relevant 
standards (e.g., for measurement).     
The second source of border effects is the distribution of social networks and 
norms.  Normative governance may facilitate exchange in markets where formal 
institutions of the state are absent or insufficient.  For example, DiMaggio and Louch 
(1998) have shown that buyers in what might otherwise be “markets for lemons” (e.g., 
used cars) are particularly likely to transact with relatives.  And Clay (1997) shows how 
coalitions of merchants employing social sanctions facilitated trade in early 19
th century 
California, when there was no state enforcement of contracts.  Of course, social relations 
sometimes span national borders, but they are overwhelmingly more common within a 
country.  Gravity-model analyses of outcomes such as migration and telephone calls 
show that there is a massive border effect for social relations as well as economic ones 
(Rietveld and Janssen, 1990; Helliwell, 1998).   
Although the evidence of border effects in global exchange has developed 
through the analysis of trade, we expect that they are even more discouraging of FDI than 
of trade.  FDI avoids some of the challenges of international economic transactions, by 
subsuming them within the organizational structure of a multinational firm.  This is 
particularly useful for transacting intangibles, such as knowledge or permission to use a   8
valuable brand.  In many cases, communication mechanisms and intellectual property 
rights are insufficient to allow such intangibles to be transferred across borders in any 
other way than by a multinational company that extends its operations via FDI (Vernon, 
1971).  Even in the case of intangibles, however, some familiar border effects apply.  In 
particular, the internal operations of a multinational corporation cannot completely 
resolve coordination problems because even thought the corporation may standardize 
within, its various national operations must, in some ways, integrate with their local 
environments.  
There are also border effects that are unique to FDI, or worse in the case of FDI 
than trade.  Foremost among these is the exposure of investments in and profits from a 
target country to some form of expropriation by the target-country government.   Such 
expropriations may range from the nationalization of a plant to a domestic legal change 
that makes it more difficult for a multinational to extract profits from a target country.  
Compared to trade, the exposure of FDI investments are notable because they are 
typically larger, and they are mainly to the target-country government, rather than to 
private companies that may be engaged in trade. 
Culture is another barrier that is uniquely problematic for FDI.  “Cultural 
distance”, that is, the extent of differences between countries regarding important cultural 
values, has been argued to discourage international transactions because it inhibits 
communication and knowledge transfer (Siegel, Licht and Schwartz, 2006; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988).   Further, FDI, unlike trade and some other international transactions, 
typically involves some transfer of persons.  Employees of the multinational company 
often relocate, even if temporarily, to the target country to set up operations, coordinate   9
with the parent firm, facilitate the transfer of intangible and tangible assets between the 
parent firm and the FDI operation, and protect those assets.  Thus, FDI between culturally 
distant countries represents an added cost of submerging employees in a national 
environment they may find confusing, stressful, or even hostile.  At the least, this 
increases concrete costs to the multinational due to premium pay and turnover.  At the 
most, firms may forego altogether some profitable FDI opportunities because the 
prospect of “living there” is so unappealing to managers and other employees. 
The Governance Role of IGOs 
If border effects exist because the traditional bases of governance of 
transactions—states and networks—are more relevant within than between countries, a 
natural source of relief would be from institutional structures that are explicitly 
international.  There is no more likely candidate than the IGO, which is an organization 
with three or more states as members.  Prominent examples are the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, but there are currently more than three 
hundred IGOs operating in the world system. While the majority of IGOs receive little 
public attention, all of them work to promote collective international goals, and many of 
these are specifically aimed at smoothing global economic transactions.  Many of these 
efforts facilitate FDI. 
The most heavy-handed FDI influence comes from IGOs such as the IMF and 
World Bank, which encourage neo-liberal economic reforms.  For example, Polillo and 
Guillen (2005:1775) quote a letter of intent from the Indonesian government to the IMF 
wherein the government reports amending the banking law to, among other things, 
“permit major improvements in…openness to FDI.” Similarly, Henisz, Zelner and   10
Guillen (2005) show that pressure from the IMF and the World Bank increased 
privatization and regulatory reform in telecommunications and electricity industries 
around the world, opening the door to increased FDI in these important sectors.  While 
these studies expose a coercive element of some important IGOs to push neoliberal 
policy on dependant countries, these same organizations promote less controversial 
policies which may be even more important for FDI.  Critical in this regard is the IMF’s 
sponsorship of convertible currency.  Its members agree to “promote international 
monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements…(IMF, 
2006).” 
Some IGOs provide dispute resolution processes that may encourage MNC’s to 
take the commitments of target governments as credible, and thereby reduce the 
perception of risk associated with FDI.  A sample of the IGOs that facilitate such credible 
commitment includes the African Reinsurance Corporation, the European Court of 
Justice, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  Many other IGOs promote the 
recognition and protection of property rights, among them the European Patent Office, 
the International Patent Cooperation Union, and the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation.  Still others promote communication and standardization, including the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, a number of postal unions, railway 
congresses, aviation councils, information banks, and centers for statistics. 
With so many IGOs so clearly aimed at reducing international transaction costs, 
we might expect that their effect on FDI would already be well documented.  In fact, we 
are aware of only one analysis relevant to this question, that of Buthe and Milner (2005), 
which looks at the effect of only one IGO (the GATT/WTO). More than that, until   11
recently there was very little evidence that IGOs promote economic outcomes of any 
type.
2  The previous failure to find evidence of IGO influence was probably due to under-
attention to the network structure through which IGOs operate.  Earlier research focused 
on the effects of membership of a single IGO.  By focusing only on one IGO, previous 
studies miss the interdependence of overlapping institutions and the complexity of dyadic 
connections.  
Recent research that specifies the influence of IGOs as working through mutliple 
and simultaneous IGO memberships of countries, has documented substantial influence 
of IGOs on a number of bilateral outcomes, including reduction in the incidence of war 
(Hafner-Burton and Alexander, 2006), and increased trade (Ingram et al., 2005) and 
environmental cooperation (Ward, 2006).   
Similarly, we expect that connections through the IGO network are the best way 
to operationalize the institutional governance that IGOs provide for FDI between two 
states.  This approach is aimed directly at capturing the dyadic nature of FDI.  Often, a 
given IGO is only useful for promoting FDI between two countries if both are part of the 
IGO and therefore subject to its policies.  This is obviously true in the case of IGOs that 
promote coordination.  It is also likely in the case of IGOs that promote FDI-friendly 
reforms, which align the economic systems of rich members and poor ones. Moreover, 
this approach recognizes institutional interdependencies across IGOs: investing in a 
country may not depend on common membership in a single IGO, but in common 
                                                 
2 One notable exception is research in international economics, which has looked at the impact of 
GATT/WTO membership on bilateral trade flows, with mixed results: Rose (2004) concludes that a 
GATT/WTO connection does not promote trade, while Subramanian and Wei (2007) conclude it does and 
estimate an increase in 120% of world trade due to GATT/WTO connectedness.   12
membership in a group of IGOs that complement and reinforce each other. Thus we 
expect that  
Hypothesis 1: FDI flows will be stronger between two countries when the connection 
between them in the IGO network is stronger. 
 
IGOs and Social Governance 
The proceeding argument reflects the role of the many IGOs that aim explicitly to 
smooth economic transactions (we will refer to these as economic IGOs, or EIGOs).  
There are, however, a substantial number of IGOs that exist to promote social and 
cultural cohesion between nations (social/cultural IGOs, or SCIGOs).  The effect of 
SCIGOs on FDI is also worth considering, particularly because cultural differences 
between nations are an important impediment to FDI.  If cultural distance inhibits FDI 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988) and increases the failure risk of foreign ventures (Zaheer, 1995), 
then SCIGOs that aim to close that distance, and reduce the “foreignness” of other 
countries’ corporations, may produce FDI.  Many SCIGOs encourage awareness through 
cultural contact, such as as with the Asia-Europe Foundation, whose mission is “to foster 
contacts and intercultural dialogue among people from all walks of life in Asia and 
Europe” (www.asef.org), or the Bureau International des Expositions, which promotes 
world fairs (www.bie-paris.org).  Many other SCIGOs promote cohesion between the 
peoples of two countries through the pursuit of shared goals, such as the eradication of 
disease and the improvement of human rights. 
The possibility that SCIGOs, and not only EIGOs increase FDI evokes the claim 
from sociology’s theory of embeddedness that social relations between traders can be the 
basis of trust, and therefore reduce transaction costs (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996).    13
Greif (1989) provides historical evidence of the social governance of international 
business by documenting the role of kinship in trading relations in the 11th century 
Mediterranean region.  Contemporary analyses have shown that there is more trade 
between countries whose populations have more trust for each other (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales, 2004) and that bilateral connections through SCIGOs are associated with 
higher trade (Ingram et al., 2005).  And most directly, Bandelj (2002) shows that FDI is 
more likely to flow to Central and Eastern European countries from investor countries 
that had stronger cultural ties to the target countries, as indicated by historical 
immigration.  This evidence, combined with arguments that cultural differences are 
particularly deleterious for FDI suggests that IGOs that promote social and cultural ends 
may also affect this important economic outcome. Therefore we expect that 
Hypothesis 2: FDI flows will be higher between countries that are more strongly 
connected through SCIGOs, and not only through EIGOs. 
 
IGOs and Domestic Institutions: Target Country Democracy  
  The most salient risk of FDI is that that government of the target country will 
expropriate the profits from the investment, or even the investments itself (Li, 2006).  
This can occur outright through nationalization, or if the government changes policies 
regarding taxes, the repatriation of profits, or competition.  These possibilities suggest 
that the efficacy of IGO connections to promote FDI may depend on domestic institutions 
in the target country.  To put it simply, we suspect that IGOs will do more to promote 
FDI for target countries whose domestic governments are unable to make credible 
commitments to investing MNCs.  In other words, we see IGO governance and domestic 
institutions as potential substitutes.   14
  The risk to an MNC’s investment in a target country is generally understood to be 
higher when the political institutions of the target are more autocratic, because 
democracies do a better job of ensuring that investments are secure (Olson, 1993).   
Evidence from economic history supports the idea that absolute power reduces a 
sovereign’s ability to make credible commitments to investors, and that the democratic 
division of power increases that ability (North and Weingast, 1989).  Li (2006) reports 
that 564 expropriation acts in 56 developing countries between 1960 and 1995, only 59 
occurred in democracies, and the level of democracy was negatively related to 
expropriation in a multivariate regression.  Buthe and Milner (2005) find that the division 
of political powers increases the inflow of FDI to developing countries.   
  There are alternative arguments of the relationship between democracy and FDI.  
Li and Resnick (2003) argue that democracies are more exposed to public demands for 
the redistribution of capital, to demands for improved labor practices, and to arguments 
by domestic competitors against advantageous competitive positions held by MNCs.   
They find that after controlling for the democratic protection of property rights, the 
residual effect of democracy is to reduce investment flows to developing countries.   
These arguments, however, apply specifically to developing countries, where poverty is 
highest and MNCs may be attracted by cheap labor and poorly regulated competition.  
The fact remains that most FDI inflows are to developed countries (Guillen, 2006).   
Further, previous analyses of the influence of democracy on FDI may have suffered from 
misspecification, because they did not consider the simultaneous impact of IGO 
connections   15
  If democracies do indeed provide better surety for FDI, then the role of IGOs for 
this purpose would presumably be smaller, suggesting that target-country democracy and 
IGO connectedness will be institutional substitutes.  This leads us to test the following 
interaction hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  Connections in the IGO network will do less to increase FDI to target 




We use gravity models to test our hypothesis.  Gravity models, originally created 
to explain bilateral trade flows, "have produced some of the clearest and most robust 
empirical findings in economics" (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1999).  The widespread 
acceptance of gravity models in international economics has been reinforced by 
continuous efforts to link them to different trade theories (Anderson, 1979; Bergrstrand 
1989; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 2001, and Evenett and Keller, 2002) and by recent 
econometric research that has improved their statistical reliability (Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003; Santos and Tenreyro,  2006).  Based on their successful application in 
the analysis of international trade, gravity models have also been applied to other dyadic 
empirical contexts, such as migration flows (Heliwell, 1997), equity flows (Portes and 
Rey, 2005), and FDI flows (Brenton et al.  1999; Brainard, 1997; Carr et al., 2001).   
Equation (1) represents a basic specification for a gravity model that explains FDI 
flows between countries i and j  (    ) as a function of country specific variables (   and 
  ), such as GDP or population, and dyadic variables (   ) such as joint income, joint 
economic size, physical and cu tu ance between country pairs, etc.    l ral dist
             
    
     
       (1)   16
    is an error term assumed to be statistically independent of   ,    and    ,  and 
with                1   . 
The standard practice is to log-linearize equation (1) and estimate the coefficients 
  by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the following equation: 
                                                          (2) 
However, Santos and Tenreyro (2006) raise two issues with this approach. First, it relies 
heavily on the assumption that      and           are statistically independent of the 
covariates, an assumption that is normally violated when error terms are heteroskedastic
3. 
As a result, OLS estimates of equation (2) would be inconsistent. Second, when the 
dependent variable is equal to zero the log-linearization is infeasible.  This issue is 
especially important in our empirical context because only a few countries account for 
most of the FDI
4 and zero flows are common among the remaining countries.  Although 
several methods are used to overcome this limitation, such as dropping the pairs where 
the dependent variable equals zero, using           1  as the dependent variable instead 
of          , or using Tobit estimation, no method guarantees that the coefficients are 
properly estimated. 
To address these problems, Santos and Tenreyro (2006) suggest a variation of the 
traditional gravity model that does not use a log-transformation of the dependent variable.  
This model, estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and using a robust 
                                                 
3 Because                 , that is, the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable y is not 
equal to the logarithm of its expected value (Jensen's inequality), the independence assumption between the 
log value of error terms and log values of covariates holds only under very specific conditions of the error 
term. When there is heteroskedasticity in the data, the independence does not hold.  
4 USA, Japan, and the countries of the European Union accounted for 78% of the senders and 50% of the 
receivers of FDI, (World Development Report 2005).   17
covariance matrix
5 instead of OLS, produces consistent estimators even in the presence 
te e o u :  of he rosk dasticity.  F llowing their approach, we estimate the following eq ation
         β                 β                              β             
 β               Σφ         Σα        ε     (3) 
whe
•   is the real value of the FDI flow from country i to country j in year t.   
re i and j denote the countries in the dyad, t represents time, and: 
      
•  flow between countries i and j in year t.             is the bilateral trade 
•     is the GDP per capita in real terms for country i in year t.           
•            is the sum of the democracy and autocracy (reverse coded) scores 
n from the Polity III Database) of country j in year t.    (take
•         is IGO connectedness, the number of IGOs that countries i and j are 
multaneously members of in year t.    si
•     is a set of fixed effects at the dyad level.   
•      is a set of year fixed effects. 
To examine hypothesis 2, we decompose the variable for IGO connectedness into two 
subcom ts:  ponen
•          is economic IGO connectedness, the number of economic IGOs that 
es i and j are simultaneously members of in year t.    countri
•           is social/cultural IGO connectedness, the number of social/cultural 
IGOs that countries i and j are simultaneously members of in year t.   
We use dyad fixed effects to account for the dependence of observations in our 
data and to control for all static dyadic influence in FDI flows, such as distance between 
                                                 
5 We obtain robust standard errors by bootstrapping.   18
the two countries, and whether they share a common language, border, religion, or 
colonial history.  Similarly, we use year fixed effects to control for historical events that 
affect all dyads, such as global economic shocks, the opening of Eastern European 
markets and technological changes.  These two sets of fixed effects control for all 
influences on FDI flows except those that vary simultaneously across time and within a 
dyad.   
Data 
Our dependent variable comes from two sources: the OECD, whose data for the 
year  2005 recorded FDI flows for 31 countries representing 87% of all outflows (World 
Investment Report, 2005), and the UNCTAD, providing data for FDI flows among 
countries that are not members of the OECD.  Using both inflow and outflow data, we are 
able to identify unidirectional FDI flows between almost 200 countries from 1980 to 
2000.   
Some idiosyncrasies of the FDI data require further comment.  If both countries in 
the dyad are in the dataset, the same unidirectional FDI flow is reported twice.  For 
example, our dataset registers the FDI flow from Canada to the USA twice: (1) as 
outflow from Canada to the United States, reported by the Canadian government, and (2) 
as inflow in the United States from Canada, reported by the American government.   
Unfortunately, a pair of data points associated with the same flow may be different since 
the OECD and the UNCTAD build their dataset based on figures provided by national 
governments, which differ on the definition of what constitutes FDI
6.  That is, the 
outflow figure from Canada to USA may differ from the inflow figure to the USA from 
                                                 
6 Although OECD countries comply with the definitions for FDI contained in the IMF Balance of Payments 
Manuals (BPM5) and the OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI (BMD), they still have some freedom to 
define the level of foreign ownership required.   19
Canada due to differences in what each country defines as FDI.  We dealt with the 
problem of duplicated flows in three ways: using their average, randomly choosing one of 
the reported flows as the actual flow, or selecting the flow reported by the country with 
the largest overall level of FDI. Although all three approaches produce similar results, we 
use average flows in our main analysis and introduce the alternative approaches in 
robustness checks.  
Countries also vary on the way they report zero FDI flows. Although some 
countries report them explicitly, most countries exclude zero FDI flows from their data. 
In most cases, zero FDI flows occur between country pairs where at least one country 
shows low values in the democracy variable. Therefore, excluding these observations 
may decrease heterogeneity in our independent variables and cause a bias toward flows 
among developed and democratic countries. To avoid this potential problem, we consider 
missing reported values as zero FDI flows. Specifically we follow two steps. First, we 
consider conservatively that a missing reported value is equal to zero only for those years 
between two non-zero FDI flows for a given country pair. For example, if in our data we 
observe a non-negative FDI outflow from Latvia to Mozambique for the years 1995 and 
1997, we assume that the outflow is zero for the year 1996. We call this approach 
interpolation
7. Second, we consider missing FDI data points equal to zero if we observe 
at least one non-zero FDI observation before or after for the dyad. We call this approach 
extrapolation
8. In the previous example, we will assign zero FDI outflows from Latvia to 
                                                 
7 The average difference of interpolated zero FDI flows with reported contiguous data points is 0.7. This 
low value reinforces a detailed inspection of the data where the interpolated zero FDI flows occur within 
data points that are either zero or close to 0. 
8 The average difference for extrapolated zero FDI flows within reported data points within a pair is 0.3. 
The low value suggests that the extrapolated values are not different from existent data.   20
Mozambique from 1980 to 1995 and from 1997 to 2000
9. Although our results are 
similar when we exclude interpolated and extrapolated observations, we present our main 
results using the extended dataset.  Dyads for which there were no explicit reports of FDI, 
zero or otherwise, in our data were excluded from the analysis. 
Our key independent variable, the IGO network, is built using is the time-varying 
listing of IGOs and their members compiled by Pevehouse et al.  (2003).  According to 
their definition, an IGO must:  
(1) include three or more members of the Correlates of War-defined state system;   
(2) hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years; and 
(3) possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters.   
We first aggregate all IGOs (AIGOs) regardless of their mandates. We then 
classified the IGOs into economic or social/cultural based on their mandates as described 
in the Yearbook of International Organizations.  We defined economic IGOs (EIGOs) as 
those whose mandates stipulate any of the following: (1) perform multiple economic 
functions, monitor and enforce international economic transactions, establish 
international trade agreements or protect property rights; (2) promote standards and 
conventions that smooth international transactions; (3) promote development or manage 
international public goods; or (4) address issues regarding the international structure and 
operations of specific industries.  This definition yielded 126 EIGOs in 1980 and 158 in 
2000.  Social/cultural IGOs (SCIGOs) are those that: (1) engage in activities related to 
conservation and environment; (2) address health, disease, disaster, social welfare or 
                                                 
9 Some restrictions still apply. For example, if a country did not exist as a political entity for any year 
within the range of interpolation or extrapolation, we do not consider a non-existent FDI flow as a zero FDI 
flow.   21
cultural issues; or (3) promote education, technology and scientific research.  Using this 
definition, we identified 77 IGOs as social/cultural in 1980 and 116 in 2000.   
For AIGOs, EIGOs and SCIGOs, we used the IGO-member listing to create time-
varying affiliation matrices of connectedness between two countries. The affiliation 
matrix for AIGOs at time t, At , is produced by multiplying Xt, a matrix whose cells 
indicate whether a country is a member of a given at time t, by its transpose Xt
T.  Thus, At 
is a symmetric country-by-country matrix where the cell aijt indicates the number of 
AIGOs in which country i and country j share joint membership at time t, the measure we 
call AIGO connectedness. Similarly, Et is a symmetric country-by-country matrix where 
the cell eijt indicates the number of EIGOs in which country i and country j share joint 
membership at time t, the measure we call EIGO connectedness.  Finally, the affiliation 
matrix for SCIGOs, St, is created in the same way by multiplying Yt, a country-by-SCIGO 
matrix whose cells indicate whether a country is a member of a given SCIGO at time t, 
by its transpose Yt
T.  We take the natural logarithms of the IGO connectedness variables 
for consistency with the treatment of other independent variables in the gravity model.   
We tap different sources to obtain the other country-level variables used in our 
models.  Our trade data comes from the compilation of unilateral trade flows generated 
by Feenstra & Lipsey (2005) that is rapidly becoming the standard in trade data.  GDP 
per capita data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World 
Bank.  With the WDI data, we also calculate the GDP deflators per country-year required 
to obtain real figures for FDI and trade flows.  Data for the democracy variable come 
from the Polity III Database, a widely used dataset in political science and international 
relations research.  Democracy is the aggregate of two orthogonal ten-point sub-scales,   22
one representing the presence of autocratic institutions in a state (reverse coded), the 
other the presence of democratic institutions.  The original range, from -10 to 10, is 
transformed into a 1 to 21 scale to allow for the log transformation. Thus 21 is the 
maximum democratic score with the value 1 capturing the most autocratic states.   
Unless otherwise indicated, the IGO independent variables in our analyses are 




Model 1 in Table 2 contains our control variables.  Model 2 adds the measure for 
connectedness through all IGOS, AIGO connectedness.  Consistent with our fundamental 
assertion (hypothesis 1) the FDI flow from country i to country j is significantly greater 
as a function of the number of IGOs that they are jointly members in.  The Poisson 
regression model is multiplicative, so the magnitude of the coefficient represents the 
impact of a change in AIGO connectedness on the ceterus paribus rate of FDI from i to j.  
The coefficient in model 2 indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in logged 
AIGO Connectedness is associated with an eighty-two percent increase in FDI (e
1.421 * 0.42 
= 1.816).  Model 3 adds the interaction between AIGO Connectedness and the level of 
democracy of the target country.  The interaction term has a negative and significant 
coefficient.  Consistent with hypothesis 3, IGO connections and target-country 
democracy are substitutes.  
Model 4 examines hypothesis 2 by decomposing the aggregate AIGO 
connectedness variable into two subcomponents, E IGO connectedness and SCIGO 
connectedness.   Both of these variables are interacted with the democracy level of the   23
target country to reflect our argument that IGO efficacy depends on target country 
institutions.  The main effect of SCIGO connections between countries is not significant, 
while the interaction between SCIGO connectedness and target country democracy is 
significant and positive.  For EIGO connectedness, the main effect is positive, and the 
interaction with target-country democracy is negative.  Figure 1 plots the combined main 
and interaction effects of SCIGO and EIGOs ties (both evaluated at their mean level) 
over the range of target-country democracy.  The cross-over point where the combined 
main and interaction effects of SCIGO connectedness acts to increase predicted FDI is at 
a target-country democracy of four or higher.  This includes 95% of our dyads, so there is 
general support for hypothesis 2, that SCIGO connectedness are associated with more 
FDI
10.  However, hypothesis 3 suggested that IGO connectedness and target-country 
democracy would be substitutes.  This relationship is apparent for EIGO connectedness, 
whose efficacy decreases with target-country democracy, but SCIGO connectedness 
appear to complement target-country democracy.  We consider this unpredicted result in 
the discussion section. 
There are deep and reciprocal interdependencies between inter-state economic 
and political relationships, so the issues of causality and endogeneity in our models 
deserve careful attention.  To begin, we highlight that in the models we have so far 
shown, the dependent variables are lagged one year, so there is no possibility of reverse 
                                                 
10 The fact that SCIGO-ties at very low levels of target-country democracy, and EIGO connectedness at 
high levels of target-country democracy are associated with reductions in the expected level of FDI was 
surprising to us.  It is not clear why an IGO tie would ever decrease the expected level of FDI.  
Supplementary analysis suggests that these outcomes are attributable to the influence on our models of a 
small set of outlier observations.  If we exclude the 100 of our 64,485 observations for which the actual 
FDI is most in excess of our estimate (these observations are mostly associated with states in obviously 
unusual circumstances, such as Argentina during the hyper-inflation period we obtain estimated multiplier 
effects for SCIGO connectedness that go up from one and for EIGO connectedness that decline to one as 
target-country democracy increases, but are never less than one.     24
causality in the simplest sense that our dependent variable causes the independent 
variable.  A much bigger worry is that both FDI and IGO connectedness could be driven 
by some common cause which was not reflected in our model.  Certainly, there are many 
dimensions of the dyadic relationship between states that affect both FDI and IGO 
connectedness, such as geographic proximity, language, a history of colonial 
relationships, and common religious or cultural heritage.  All of these influences, 
however, are accounted for by the dyad fixed effects in our model, which represent all of 
the time invariant features of a dyad.  Similarly, our year fixed effects account for global 
trends over time that might influence both FDI and IGO connectedness, such as 
technological changes that increase bi-national awareness and sympathy (the internet and 
cheaper air travel come to mind), shocks to the global system such as the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, or a diffuse cultural trend of globalization.  What our fixed effects don’t 
account for are variables that change within a dyad over time, but the two that seem most 
likely as simultaneous influences on FDI and trade are directly controlled for in our 
models: (1) the wealth of the countries in a dyad; and (2) the trade between the countries 
in a dyad. 
While we believe that the most likely common cause variables are accounted for 
in our model specification, there are other possibilities that our controls do not preclude.  
It is therefore worth highlighting just what an alternative explanation would have to 
account for.  It is not sufficient merely to account for a positive association between IGO 
connectedness and FDI; our theory also predicts, and our results show, a negative 
interaction between IGO connectedness and target-country democracy.  A credible 
alternative explanation would also have to account for this interaction.  Furthermore, our   25
results show very different effects of EIGO and SCIGO connectedness as target-country 
democracy increases.  Although we had not predicted this a priori, we will explain in the 
discussion that these findings are consistent with our position that EIGO and SCIGO 
connectedness represent very different mechanisms of governance.   
The set of omitted variables and alternative explanations that might account for 
this complex, but theoretically consistent, pattern of IGO tie effects is vanishingly small.  
Add to this some important facts about the processes that bring about IGO connectedness 
and FDI.  First, different agents are responsible for these two outcomes—states engage in 
IGOs, while companies engage in FDI.  Thus, alternatives must explain the mobilization 
of these two agents, and cannot rely only on the initiative of states, or that of companies.  
Furthermore, IGO connectedness are not easily focused on a signal dyadic relationship—
when a country joins an IGO it adds a tie with at least two countries, and typically many 
more.  This frustrates alternatives that derive from purely dyadic mechanisms.   
Altogether, the hurdles for alternative explanations to the causal logic we present loom 
very large. Nevertheless, we conducted additional analyses to test our approach in model 
5, which relies on five-year lags of our IGO tie variables.  All of the coefficients for 
EIGO connectedness, SCIGO connectedness, and their interactions with target-country 
democracy are comparable whether IGO connectedness are lagged one or five years.  
This is consistent with our theoretical claims, because the information, trust and affect 
impact of an IGO tie would be expected to endure over time.  The result further raises the 
bar for alternative explanations by demanding that they account for this lag. 
The subsequent models establish in table 2 demonstrate robustness of our results 
regardless of assumptions about the level of FDI between dyad-years for which we don’t   26
have explicit reports of FDI.  In model 6 we include only dyads for which we have at 
least one positive FDI report in the year for one of the countries in the dyad (which 
demonstrates that they participated in FDI reporting in the year).  In model 7 we include 
only observations for which we have an explicit report of FDI, making no interpolation or 
extrapolation of zero FDI flows for countries that did not report.  These screens reduce 
our number of observations by roughly two-thirds, but the results are comparable in all 
substantive ways to our full model. 
In table 3 we reproduce the specifications of models 1-5 three times, using 
different approaches for reconciling the flow of FDI from country i to country j as 
reported by i and by j.  (Recall in table 2 we took the average of duplicate reports). In 
models 6-10 we choose randomly between duplicate reports; in models 11-15 we take the 
report of the country that engages in more FDI; and in models 16-20 we use a three-year 
moving average of reported flows.  In all cases results correspond to those in table 2 in all 
substantive ways. 
Our robustness checks serve another purpose, as a response to concerns about 
multicolinearity.  As would be expected, there is a large positive correlation (.80) 
between ln(EIGO connectedness) and ln(SCIGO connectedness).  Could the opposite 
signs on the main effects of these variables and on their interactions with target-country 
democracy be attributable to multicolinearity?  The consistency of our results across six 
different samples and versions of our data suggests no.  As Greene (1997) suggests, 
multicolinearity results in coefficients that are sensitive to small changes in the 
construction of variables, or the inclusion of observations.  Across the models reported 
here, and many other estimations conducted in supplementary analysis, the pattern of   27
influence of EIGO and SCIGO connectedness, across the range of target-country 




Economic globalization presents severe governance challenges.  The insufficiency of 
states as a source of surety for transactions that transcend national borders creates an 
opportunity for an increased role for organizations in the global institutional framework.  
In this paper we applied a network methodology to show how one type of organization, 
the IGO, facilitates the cross-border investments of another type, the MNC.  We further 
document a fascinating interdependence between domestic institutions, specifically 
democracy, and the international institutions represented by IGOs.  The results help to 
understand which countries attract FDI, and from which senders.  They also point to an 
emerging rivalry between states and organizations as sources of governance in the global 
economy. 
We show that both economic and social/cultural IGO connectedness increase the 
FDI that flows between two countries.  The social/cultural effect is the more novel of 
these two, and it is provocative for both FDI and theories of governance.  For FDI, the 
influence of SCIGO connectedness reinforces arguments that social and cultural 
differences are a major barrier to cross-border investment, and therefore to global 
economic integration.  More optimistically, the result also suggests that IGOs are a 
mechanism for reducing social/cultural differences, or at least for reducing the negative 
effect of those differences on FDI.  For governance, this result highlights the role the 
social mechanisms can play in smoothing even the most high-stakes economic 
exchanges.  Sociologists have long argued that socially embedded sentiments, such as   28
trust, empathy and affinity, support exchange (e.g., Granovetter, 1985).  Nevertheless, 
unambiguous evidence in support of that claim is scarce, mostly because important and 
ongoing exchange relations often co-occur with social relations, making it difficult to 
isolate the benefit of social governance (Uzzi, 1996; Gibbons, 1999).  The distinction 
between economic and social/cultural IGOs provides a rare opportunity to compare 
economic and social governance mechanisms.  Furthermore, as Figure 1 suggests, 
SCIGO connectedness have a more positive affect on FDI than EIGO connectedness 
when target-country democracy is greater than 10, a condition that is met for roughly 
three-quarters of our observations.  That SCIGO connectedness are not only a positive 
influence on FDI, but often more positive than EIGO connectedness is a victory for one 
of economic sociology’s core assumptions, that social governance is sometimes the best 
support for transactions, and not merely a second-best alternative to more formal 
governance mechanisms. 
As for economic IGO connections, their influence, is from one perspective 
unsurprising.  After all, many economic IGOs are formed explicitly to facilitate global 
economic exchanges such as trade and FDI, so this result may be seen as merely 
confirming that they serve their intended function.  On the other hand, the fact that an 
IGO performs its intended function may be surprising to many, particularly in the face of 
popular and scholarly arguments that these organizations are either ineffectual or shells 
through which powerful and rich countries legitimize their exploitation of the poor and 
weak (examples include Stiglitz, 2003; Rose, 2004; and Easterly 2006).   
Whether or not our main EIGO result is viewed as surprising, it indicates the 
empirical utility of the “network turn” in research on international organization.  Only a   29
few years ago, there was little evidence that IGOs did anything at all.  The great leap 
forward in the evidence of IGO efficacy occurred with the methodological innovation of 
considering the network of bilateral connections created by IGOs, rather than merely 
counting the numbers of IGOs in the world, or the number of IGOs a given country was 
part of.  The demonstrated utility of this approach for the field of international 
organization suggests an opportunity for the field of organizational theory.  We began 
this paper by pointing to the equivalence of IGOs and MNCs as organizational responses 
to the governance challenges of global economic exchange.  Just as many bilateral 
transactions are better understood by conceptualizing the influence of IGOs in network 
turns, we would argue that a kindred approach would add much clarity regarding the 
influence of MNCs.  We foresee a network where nodes are countries, and the edges are 
connections forged by MNCs that operate in both countries.  Just as we have 
differentiated ties forged by SCIGOs and EIGOs, the MNC network could be 
differentiated by key characteristics of the MNCs, such as experience, ownership 
structure, and strategy.  We predict that an MNC network thus conceived would predict 
many of the same outcomes that the IGO network predicts: trade, FDI, political change, 
and war.  This line of research would provide a path to a more fully integrated account of 
international political economy, and clarify MNC interdependence with and influence 
relative to states, IGOs, and NGOs.  
Some reconciliation between our evidence that IGO connections encourage FDI 
and criticisms that certain IGOs are ineffective or worse comes through the interactions 
we estimate between IGO connectedness and target-country democracy.  As the critics 
have observed, IGO connections do less to encourage FDI flows to some countries.     30
Intriguingly, the impact of EIGO and SCIGO connections move in opposite directions 
with increases in the democracy and relative power of target countries.  When the target 
country is more democratic, EIGO connections do less and SCIGO connections do more 
to increase FDI flows.  The negative interdependence between EIGO connections and 
target-country democracy suggests a substitution between international and domestic 
governance mechanisms.  This effect is intriguing because it suggests that even though 
FDI is a transaction that spills over the legal jurisdiction of any one state, the 
commitments of target-country governments, which are more credible if those 
governments are more democratic (Henisz, 2000), go a substantial way to assuring MNCs 
that their investments will be safe.  This estimation also helps to clear up a baffling 
finding in previous research, that FDI was sometimes found to be less likely to flow to 
democratic countries.  When we consider the interaction between target-democracy and 
IGO connections, the main effect of democracy switches to be positive.  This suggests 
that previous analyses may have suffered from misspecification, and that, consistent with 
theory on states’ capacity to commit to foreign investors and business folk wisdom as 
reflected in country risk rankings, democracies are more attractive targets for FDI. 
Target democracy interacts in the opposite way with SCIGO connections, to 
increase the flow of FDI, an effect that surely derives from the unique governance 
mechanisms embedded in networks of social/cultural, as opposed to economic, relations.   
One explanation for this is that the sources of FDI are overwhelmingly the “first world” 
democratic countries (Guillen, 2006).  The social/cultural connections of these sender 
countries to potential targets may be more effective if those targets are more democratic 
due to an international equivalent to interpersonal homophily.  When an SCIGO brings   31
the citizens of two democracies together, political similarity may enhance trust, smooth 
communication, and facilitate relationship building.  Another explanation is that non-
democratic targets may not get as much out of SCIGO connections because they are less 
open, and therefore less willing to exploit to the fullest opportunities for social and 
cultural contact.  Consider for example the stereotype that the contingents from Eastern 
Bloc countries at international events during the cold war were heavily guarded, 
constrained and otherwise inhibited.  Either way, the result indicates that for states as for 
individuals, employing social governance requires a certain capacity for sociability—the 
ability to strike up and maintain social relationships with others that are sufficiently 
positive that they may be the basis of trust, empathy and affect. 
If the direct implications of this paper are to inform as to what institutional 
conditions make FDI more or less likely, a very important indirect implication is with 
regard to the interdependence between institutional forms. The contest between states and 
international organizations for institutional primacy is shaping up to be one of the 
fundamental political economy issues of our time.   One characterization of this contest is 
that international organizations are winning it, affecting what Strange (1996) has called a 
retreat of the state.  Our results support this as they show a substitution effect between 
states and IGOs, at least for the EIGOs which are explicitly targeted at governing global 
economic transactions.  On the other hand, it could be argued that the mere fact that 
target democracy affects FDI at all signals a victory for the relevance of the state for 
global transactions. Even more significant is that there is a positive interdependence 
between SCIGOs and target democracy, a relationship that is largely unforeseen in a 
literature that has highlighted rivalry between international organizations and states, and   32
attended more to the influence of EIGOs such as the IMF and the World Bank than on 
SCIGOs which rely on very different governance mechanisms. 
The resulting conclusion must be that the interrelationship between domestic and 
international governance is more complex than previous accounts have recognized.  And 
while our findings may give hope to those who see a substantial role for the state as 
economic globalization progresses, there can be no claim that the network forged by 
international organizations is not massively and increasingly important in this regard.   
We have argued that inter-governmental networks fill an institutional chasm, by forging 
relationships that span country borders.  The evidence supports this argument: The 
connections between states through both economic and social/cultural IGOs weigh 
positively and heavily as influences on which states receive FDI from which others.    




Anderson, James E. 1979. “A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation” The 
American Economic Review. Vol. 69, Iss. 1; p. 106 
 
Anderson James E. and Eric van Wincoop. 2003 “Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the 
border puzzle”. The American Economic Review. Vol. 93, Iss. 1; p. 170  
 
Bandelj, Nina. 2002. “Embedded economies: Social relations as determinants of foreign 
direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe.” Social Forces, 81: 409-444. 
 
Brainard Lael. 1997. “An empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration trade-off 
between multinational sales and trade”. The American Economic Review. Vol. 87, Iss. 4; 
p. 520 
 
Brenton Paul, Francesca Di Mauro and Matthias Lucke.1999 “Economic integration and 
FDI: An empirical analysis of foreign investment in the EU and in Central and Eastern 
Europe”. Empirica. Vol. 26, Iss. 2; p. 95 
 
Buthe, Tim and Helen V. Milner. 2005. “The politics of foreign direct investment into 
developing countries: Increasing FDI through policy commitment via trade agreements 
and investment treaties?”  Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Duke 
University. 
 
Carr David, James R Markusen and Keith E Maskus. 2001. “Estimating the knowledge-
capital model of the multinational enterprise”. The American Economic Review. Vol. 91, 
Iss. 3; p. 693 
 
Clay, Karen. 1997.  “Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican 
California.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13: 202-231. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Hugh Louch. 1998.  Socially Embedded Consumer Transactions: 
For What Kinds of Purchases do People Use Networks Most? American Sociological 
Review: 619-37. 
 
Easterly, William. 2006. White Man’s Burden.  New York: Penquin Press. 
 
Evenett Simon and Wolfgang Keller. 2002. “On theories explaining the success of the 
gravity equation”. The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 110, Iss. 2; p. 281  
 
Feenstra Robert, James R Markusen, and Andrew K Rose. 2001. “Using the gravity 
equation to differentiate among alternative theories of trade”. The Canadian Journal of 
Economics. Malden: May 2001. Vol. 34, Iss. 2; p. 430 
   34
Fligstein, Neil and Alec Stone-Sweet. 2002. "Constructing markets and politics: An 
institutionalist account of European integration." American Journal of Sociology , 107: 
1206-43. 
Gibbons, Robert. 1999. “Taking Coase Seriously.” Administrative Science Quarterly 44-
145-57. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510. 
Greene, William H. 1997. Econometric Analysis, Third Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Greif Avner. 1989. “Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the 
Maghribi traders.”  Journal of Economic History. 49:857-82 . 
 
Guillen, 2006.  “Mauro Guillen’s indicators of Globalization.” http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/guillen/files/Global.Table.1980-2003.pdf ; accessed 
March 12, 2006. 
 
Guiso, Luigie, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2004. "Cultural Biases in Economic 
Exchange.” Working paper, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. 
Evanston, IL. 
 
Gartzke, Erik. 2002. "Do International Organizations Promote Peace?" Unpublished 
Paper, Columbia University Department of Political Science. New York. 
 
Hafner-Berton, Emilie M., and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2006. “Power Positions: 
International Organizations, Social Networks and Conflict.”  Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 
 
Helliwell, John F. 1997. “National borders, trade and migration” Pacific Economic 
Review, 2:3, pp. 165-185 
 
Helliwell, John F. 1998. How Much Do National Borders Matter? Washington: 
Brookings Institute. 
 
Helliwell, John F. 2002. “Measuring the width of national borders.” Review of 
International Economics, 10: 517-24. 
 
IMF, 2006. http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm.  Accessed on March 9, 2006. 
 
Karns, Margaret P. and Karen A. Mingst. 2004. International Organizations The Politics 
And Processes Of Global Governance. Boulder, CO: Rienner. 
 
Kogut, Bruce and Harbir Singh. 1988. “The effect of national culture on the choice of 
entry mode.” Journal of International Business, 19: 411-432.   35
 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Leamer, Edward and J. Levinsohn. 1995. “International Trade Theory: The Evidence”, in 
G.M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam 
 
Li, Quan. 2006. “Democratic governance and property rights protection for foreign direct 
investors in the developing world.” Working paper, Department of Political Science, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
 
Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and 
foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries.” International Organization, 
57: 175-211. 
 
Macaulay, Stuart. 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study. 
American Sociological Review. 28:55-67 
 
North Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and credible 
commitments: the evolution of the institutions of public choice in 17
th century England. J. 
Econ. Hist. 49:803-32 
 
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, democracy, and development.” American Political 
Science Review. 87: 567-576. 
 
Polillo, Simone and Mauro F. Guillen. 2005.  “Globalization pressures and the state: The 
worldwide spread of central bank independence.” American Journal of Sociology, 110: 
1764-1802. 
 
Portes Robert, and Helene Rey 2005. “The determinants of cross-border equity flows”. 
Journal of International Economics. Amsterdam: Mar 2005. Vol. 65, Iss. 2; p. 269 
 
Rietveld, Piet and Leon Janssen, 1990. “Telephone calls and communication barriers 
The case of The Netherlands.”  Annals of Regional Science, 24: 307-318. 
 
Rose, Andrew K. 2001. “Currency unions and trade: The effect is large.”  Economic 
Policy, 33:449-461. 
 
Rose, Andrew K. 2004.  Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? The 
American Economic Review. Nashville: Mar 2004. Vol. 94, Iss. 1; pg. 98, 17 pgs 
 
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence 
and International Organizations. New York: Norton. 
   36
Santos, Joao and Silvana Tenreyro. 2005. "The Log of Gravity," CEPR Discussion 
Papers 5311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. 
 
Schneider, Friedrich and Bruno S. Frey. 1985. “Economic and political determinants of 
foreign direct investment.” World Development, 13: 161-175. 
 
Siegel, Jordan I., Amir N. Licht and Shalom N. Schwartz. 2006. “Egalitarianism and 
international investment.” Paper presented at the Harvard International Business 
Conference, March 2006. 
 
Subramaniana, Arvind and Wei,  Shang-Jin. 2007. "The WTO promotes trade, strongly 
but unevenly" Journal of International Economics Volume 72, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 
151-175  
 
Stigltz, Joseph E. 2003. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: Norton. 
 
Teece, David J. 1986. “Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise: 
An Assessment”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  Vol.7, Iss. 1;  pg. 21. 
 
Uzzi, Brian. 1996. "The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect." American Sociological Review 
61:674-98. 
Vernon, Raymond. 1971. Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US 
Enterprises, New York: Basic Books. 
World Investment Report. 2005. United Nations Conference for Trade and Developemnt 
(UNCTAD). 
 
Zaheer, Srilata. 1995. "Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness." Academy of 
Management Journal 38:341-63. 
 
Ward, Hugh. 2006. “International linkages and environmental sustainability: The 
effectiveness of the regime network.” Journal of Peace Research, 43: 149-166.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) FDIij 92.44      1,194      1
(2) ln(Tradeij) 10.06      4.27        0.103    1
(3) ln(GDP per capitai x GDP per cap 17.05      2.13 0.098 0.449 1.000
(4) ln(Target Democracy) 2.61        0.70 0.037 0.177 0.328 1.000
(5) ln(All IGO Tiesij) 3.60        0.42 0.107 0.406 0.300 0.245 1
(6) ln(Economic IGO Tiesij) 2.97        0.40 0.107 0.440 0.315 0.258 0.960 1
(7) ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesij) 2.30        0.43 0.103 0.281 0.203 0.227 0.905 0.797 1
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TABLE 1  38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Tradeij) 0.05 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.047 0.054 0.054
(2.80)** (3.23)** (2.68)** (3.18)** (3.09)** (3.70)** (3.61)**
ln(GDP per capitai x GDP per capitaj) 0.193 0.159 0.097 0.113 0.166 0.797 0.797
(1.28) (0.87) (0.64) (0.81) (1.11) (3.08)** (3.43)**
ln(Target Democracy) -0.954 -0.976 2.13 2.606 1.861 1.399 1.143
(7.28)** (8.51)** (2.06)* (2.85)** (2.12)* (1.21) (1.02)
ln(All IGO Tiesijt-1) 1.421 3.587
(2.75)** (4.64)**
ln(All IGO Tiesijt-1) * ln(Target Democracy) -0.841
(3.04)**
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-1) 4.62 2.829 2.519
(6.37)** (2.79)** (2.18)*
ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesijt-1) -0.952 -1.286 -1.298
(1.39) (1.53) (1.54)
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-1) * ln(Target Democracy) -1.77 -1.307 -1.204
(6.02)** (3.52)** (2.99)**
ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesijt-1) * ln(Target Democracy) 0.784 0.793 0.782
(2.50)* (2.47)* (2.30)*
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-5) 3.683
(3.95)**
ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesijt-5) -2.218
(2.44)*
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-5) * ln(Target Democracy) -1.812
(5.23)**
ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesijt-5) * ln(Target Democracy) 1.147
(3.94)**
Dyad fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
TABLE 2
FIXED EFFECTS (Dyad and Year) GRAVITY MODELS OF UNILATERAL FDI FLOWSij, 1980-2000. POISSON 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 65,039      64,485     64,485      64,485      61,373      23,819     20,185    
# of dyads 1,952        1,949       1,949        1,949        1,925        1,733       1,712      
z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected via boostrapping
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  39
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
ln(Tradeij) 0.044 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.043 0.041 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047
(2.51)* (2.67)** (2.73)** (2.96)** (2.76)** (2.19)* (2.43)* (2.11)* (2.18)* (2.47)* (2.21)* (2.62)** (2.71)** (2.54)* (2.86)**
ln(GDP per capitai x GDP per capitaj) 0.173 0.146 0.118 0.144 0.135 0.293 0.28 0.242 0.3 0.28 0.75 0.667 0.542 0.617 0.525
-1.24 -1.06 -0.77 -1.01 -0.77 -1.53 -1.56 -1.26 (2.39)* -1.21 (2.64)** (2.25)* (1.99)* (2.15)* -1.73
ln(Target Democracy) -1.1 -1.132 0.403 -1.11 1.233 -1.027 -1.044 1.426 -1.023 2.203 -1.031 -1.061 2.482 -1.052 2.719
(9.56)** (9.59)** -0.31 (10.87)** -1.2 (7.77)** (7.06)** -0.92 (6.67)** (2.37)* (7.49)** (9.43)** -1.65 (9.75)** (2.58)*
ln(All IGO Tiesijt-1) 1.554 2.653 1.08 2.828 1.745 4.281
(2.94)** (2.46)* (2.01)* (2.27)* (3.12)** (3.86)**
ln(All IGO Tiesijt-1) * ln(Target Democracy) -0.416 -0.67 -0.956
-1.2 -1.59 (2.43)*
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-1) -0.245 3.889 -0.707 4.264 0.238 4.951
-0.42 (3.60)** -1.05 (4.67)** -0.38 (4.63)**
ln(Social/Cultural IGO Tiesijt-1) 1.353 -1.208 1.448 -1.201 1.107 -0.612
(2.62)** -1.45 (2.24)* -1.21 (2.37)* -0.99
ln(Economic IGO Tiesijt-1) * ln(Target Democracy) -1.479 -1.8 -1.71
(3.45)** (5.45)** (4.97)**




Observations 65,425    64,871    64,871    64,871    64,871    64,951    64,397    64,397    64,397    64,397    58,526    58,526    58,526    58,526    58,526   
# of dyads 1,952      1,949      1,949      1,949      1,949      1,952      1,949      1,949      1,949      1,949      1,959      1,959      1,959      1,959      1,959     
z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected via boostrapping
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Unilateral flows are chosen randomly when 
duplicates exist
Unilateral flows are chosen by precedence when 
duplicates exist
Unilateral flows are calaclauted as a 3 year moving 
average
FIXED EFFECTS (Dyad and Year) GRAVITY MODELS OF UNILATERAL FDI FLOWSij, 1980-2000. ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
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Effect of IGO Connectedness on FDI over the range of Democracy
Figure 1